Nevertheless,the overwhelmingly major part of Shibusawa's ordinary daily schedule was occupied by the monitoring of the numerous companies that he was involved in as an executive official,and by planning for the establishment of even other compa nies.2Despite the astounding fact that he invested staggering sums of money in large numbers of companies,hardly any research on Shibusawa has dealt with the aspect of his investments and manage ment.For this reason,I propose in this paper to look at the kinds of business frameworks Shibusawa selected,adapted,and tried to apply to Japanese conditions in order to have modern business take root in Japan,and how he himself used those frameworks,with my main attention focused upon the aspect of his investments . dictions in the class society that existed in the Edo period,when everyone had to submit without objection to the outrageous demands of the warrior class,and took part in the political move ments that bubbled over after Perry's visit to Japan.He would go so far as to plan such direct action against the foreigners as taking over castles controlled by the shogunate and torching the open port in Yokohama,but just before the plan was initiated he realized how reckless it was and abruptly called it off.He went into hiding in Kyoto to escape the shogunate's search for the plotters.He entered the services of Yoshinobu Hitotsubashi,a man of whom people had high expectations as being the most enlightened person in the shogunate(and the man who later would become the fifteenth shogun),and for his services Shibusawa acquired the status of a war rior.After Yoshinobu became the shogun,the government sent a group to represent it at the Paris Exposition,and Shibusawa was chosen to accompany the group.This enabled Shibusawa to see with his own eyes the advanced world of Western Europe.
During his absence the shogunate fell.Upon his return to Japan, Shibusawa had an opportunity,albeit a very short one,to experi ment with a modern business in Shizuoka Prefecture,where Yoshi nobu was living in seclusion.Later he was promoted to a position in the government,and,in the Ministry of finance,he was engaged in enlightening businessmen and in other activities aimed at smooth ing the way for the introduction into Japan of banks and companies. Caught up in political maneuverings,he resigned his government post and became the president of Dai-Ichi National Bank,for whose establishment he had been lobbying Mitsui and other wealthy mer chants while working for the government.
With a foothold in Dai-Ichi National Bank,Shibusawa then went on to become involved in a whole host of companies.He acted as the chairman of the board of Tokyo Gas,Nihon Renga Seizo K.K. ( In1909,on the occasion of his seventieth birthday ,he resigned from almost all of these positions,remaining only as the president of Dai-Ichi Bank.Then in1916,at the age of77 ,he also gave up his position as president of Dai-Ichi Bank,the base of all his business activities,and retired entirely from the front line of the business world.He still continued to be active,however ,promoting private sector diplomacy,spreading dedication to business virtues ,and encouraging new ways to handle labor problems .In1931,his long life came to an end with his passing away at the age of92 . Shibusawa's total income.Although he was the chairman of the board or some other member of the board of sev eral companies,almost none of these were paid positions,and his salaried income was derived mainly from Dai-Ichi National Bank . What bonuses and remunerations he received from companies where he held executive positions were in the nature of special bonuses for officials,but the total of all these did not amount to much. When we look at expenditures,we find that only about one-third of the total amount were daily outgoings such as living expenses. The overwhelmingly largest proportions of expenditures took the form of deposits in banks or other financial institutions and the pay ment of interest on borrowed money.
An analysis of gains and losses in assets

Table2brings
together assets such as securities,money lent out, and money deposited,but it does not include assets like land or real estate.
If you look at the section headed"Gains in Assets,"the first thing you will notice is that there is more investment in[ctd.on p.16] partnership companies(called tokumei kumiai in Japanese,lit. "anonymous associations")than there is in joint -stock corporations .
There is little that is known about the inner workings of these dor mant partnership companies.What we do know is that the Asahi Yaki and Asano Kogyo concerns listed in the table were enterprises connected with Soichiro Asano,and Asano-related enterprises took the lion's share of Shibusawa's financing of dormant partnership companies.The widely held image of Shibusawa is that of someone who strongly advocated the principle of incorporation and devoted his energies to publicizing and spreading systems of joint-stock incorporation.What we can see here,however,is a different image of someone who,while he was promoting joint-stock incorporation, was himself making use of other types of companies to provide assis tance to people starting out as entrepreneurs.
Let us look more closely at his financing of/investing in joint stock companies.We see that investment in such companies took the form of paid-up capital in the case of eleven of them and share purchases in the case of two of them,amounting to a total of32,560 yen for the thirteen companies(Table2,from Meiji Kasai Hoken down to Tokyo Jinzo Hiryo).I think we can assume that there was little subscribing in newly issued shares in1891because of the repercussions of the recession in1890.
In contrast to the allocation of financing to dormant partnership companies,the paying up of capital tended to be dispersed more evenly over a comparatively wider spectrum.Thus we see that, because the recession was adding problems to the usual teething problems of joint-stock companies that were just starting up,not all of the companies that Shibusawa was involved with at this time were successful.
Another thing that stands out is the large number of loans.When you add together corporate bonds and loans to individuals you find that almost as much was invested in this form as in other forms of investment.In1891,the first year of the rise of enterprise in Japan, it apparently was necessary to provide funds in a variety of ways: investment in joint-stock companies,investment in dormant part nership companies,and lending to individual entrepreneurs. The most lucrative(in terms of the amount of money obtained from the sale of the shares,and the largest profit on such sales) were the shares of the Bank of Japan and of the Thirty-Second National Bank(Dai-Sanjuni Ginko).The other shares did not bring in much profit,and this would most likely be the result of the reces sion.What is most surprising is that the shares of Dai-Ichi National Bank and Hokkaido Tanka Railway were sold at almost no profit whatsoever. tinguish whether this means the subscription to new shares issued by a new company or investment in additional shares by a company they already own shares in.For this reason I judged that,wherever there was more than one subscription to shares in the same com pany,the transactions from the second time onward were purchases of additional shares in an already existing company.8 I would like to begin the discussion of share subscriptions in new and existing companies from the two aspects of fluctuations in absolute quantity and changes in the ratios of the two types.To begin with absolute quantity:there is no significantly large differ ence from year to year in the subscriptions of shares in new compa nies,but in contrast there are several years (1917,1919,1920,and 1926 )in which extremely large sums are spent to purchase addi tional shares in companies whose shares the family already owned. In1917the family subscribed to nearly17,000Asano Cement Co. shares;in1919the main reason for the large sum spent was that the family subscribed to Shibusawa family companies'shares worth 1,700,000yen,and they also subscribed to20,000Dai-Ichi Bank shares.In1920the largest outlays were for24,000Asano Cement shares,15,000Shibusawa Warehouse Co.shares,and9,000Den'en Toshi shares,while in1926the major factors were a capital increase of5,000,000yen in Shibusawa family companies and a subscription to10,000shares
in Asano Cement and5,000shares in Chichibu Railway.Almost all the above-named companies are companies well known for their close association with Shibusawa. Next let us see what we can learn from the changes in ratios of the two types of subscriptions(in new and in existing companies). The two periods in which the ratio of subscriptions in new company shares was comparatively high were the first half of the1890s and the seven-year period from1906to1912.The first of these,the first half of the1890s,was called the share boom period,while the decade from1907was known as the third enterprise surge period. In Shibusawa's case there was no single year in which share sub scriptions in new companies stood out,but(as one might expect) the ratio of companies that he became a shareholder in rose to high levels in periods in which there was a boom in shares or in periods in which the economy in general was booming. Also,whereas the enterprise surges till then had leaned heavily toward the railroad and spinning industries, now completely new types of business were increasing in numbers.One example of this was the expansion in electric power operations with the appearance of such companies as Nagoya Denryoku(Nagoya Electric Power Co.),Keihan Denki(Keihan Electric Co.),Eiko Suido Denki ,and Joban Suiryoku Denki(Joban Hydro-Electric Co. Investment in limited,unlimited,and dormant partnership companies
Next I would like to move from investment in joint-stock companies to a discussion of Shibusawa's investments in other forms of enter prise organizations.The types of enterprise arrangements towards which he could invest money in his day were limited partnership companies,unlimited partnership companies,and dormant part nerships,and investment could be made through subscriptions to shares and for subscriptions to corporate bonds or debentures.As we see in Table3,investment in limited partnership companies was comparatively constant until1914;investment in unlimited partner ships and dormant partnership companies continued until the last years of his life.We can also see that in some years his investments in these forms of enterprise exceeded his investment in joint-stock companies.Many of his investments were in dormant partnership companies whose names would not have been familiar to most people.
Limited partnership companies were made up of two types of investors:those who had unlimited liability(active partners)and those who had limited liability(limited partners).The former held the authority to manage the business and in return bore unlimited liability,while the latter,because they did not have the right to man age the business,had no more liability than the amount of money they had invested in the company.
In an unlimited partnership,on the other hand,all the investors held the authority to manage the business,and all of them were Foremost among the investment targets with these two types of organization were Asano Cement Co.,an enterprise controlled by Soichiro Asano,a close associate of Shibusawa,and Tokachi Kaikon Co.,Ltd.,staunchly supported by Kisaku Shibusawa,an elder cousin of Eiichi's.Then there were individually run businesses like Fuji wara Tanko Co.and Katsuzo Nishimura's Sakura Kumi Co.In Asano Cement Shibusawa was an investing partner with limited liability, while in Tokachi Kaikon he was an active partner with unlimited lia bility.13We can see that,when it came to businesses that came close to being individually run businesses or businesses that did not require very large amounts of funding,Shibusawa was choosing to invest in those that were incorporated as companies.We can also see that he invested,for a variety of reasons,in businesses that were quite far from being transplants of modern industries. By turning the spotlight on the investment side of Eiichi Shibusawa and analyzing the types of companies he took part in,we have been able to see an image of Eiichi Shibusawa the entrepreneur that is very different from the Shibusawa-as-public-figure image that peo ple might have held until now. In analyzing the trends over the period of a year in the funds and assets of the Shibusawa family,we have seen that his personal family budget had as its principal source of income the dividends from companies in which he held shares,and that profits from his sales of shares provided the wherewithal to satisfy requests for some next investment.This itself showed that he was an investor-entrepreneur interested in maintaining the family budget in a healthy state.
When we combined long-term movements in funds and assets with those over the one-year period,we found an industry-fostering model that differs from the general understanding of his efforts widely held previously,namely that he went on promoting modern industry mainly by fostering joint-stock companies.In other words, what Eiichi Shibusawa was doing was molding the joint-stock com pany format to companies that had a high public-interest character and required large amounts of capital;the limited partnership for mat to high-risk high-return situations;and the unlimited partner ship format to small-scale,individual businesses,combining this last with a dormant partnership format in order to put a limit on the investor's risks.Instead of thinking only of joint-stock companies as the infrastructure for business,he was choosing organizational forms that suited the scale of operations and the objectives of the business involved.At the same time Shibusawa was mindful of dis persing investors'risks,and at a time when Japan was trying to mod ernize and yet the number of investors was to a certain extent lim ited,a safety net like this was an indispensable means of allaying the fears of investors and attracting them.
As we have seen,then,Eiichi Shibusawa the entrepreneur him self owned shares,lived off their dividend payments,added to his pool of investment funds from the profits gained by selling off shares as needed,and used various combinations of company for mats(depending on scales of operations,objectives,and the nature
